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This article is concerned with the relationship between primary and
secondary law in the EU, as it emerges from the case law of the Court of
Justice. It examines the broad spectrum of ways in which the Court deals
with secondary law, considering in particular the extent to which the
Court allows the passage of secondary legislation to affect its reading of
primary law. The case law of the Court is difficult to predict, and difficult
to evaluate. The “proper” relationship between primary and secondary
law depends on one’s assessment of the “legal” or “political” nature of
the EU’s constitutional settlement, and on one’s views about the
relationship between, and legitimacy of, the judiciary and the legislature
at EU level.
1. Introduction
This article aims to provoke the reader into thinking about the relationship
between primary and secondary law in the EU, as it emerges from the case law
of the European Court of Justice. The main aim is to illustrate the effect which
the passage of secondary legislation (regulations, directives, etc.) may have on
the case law of the Court interpreting primary law (both the Treaties and
general principles of EU law).1Most lawyers would, at first blush, assume that
there is a simple hierarchical relationship between primary and secondary law,
that primary law does and should take priority over secondary law, and that
the adoption of secondary legislation should not affect the way in which
primary law is interpreted. Political scientists on the other hand, might expect
the passage of legislation to have a greater impact on the case law of the Court.
The somewhat confused reality which this article exposes, illuminates the
tensions between the judiciary and the legislature in the EU, and between what
may be termed the “legal” or “political” nature of the EU’s constitutional
* University of Bristol. I would like to thank Diego Acosta, Gareth Davies, James
Kolaczkowski, Akis Psygkas, Julian Rivers, and the anonymous referees.
1. See also Davies, “Legislative control of the European Court of Justice”, 51 CML Rev.
(2014), 1579.
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settlement.The hope is that this article will provoke further academic research
into the “proper” relationship between primary and secondary law; and that, in
time, the approach of the judiciary to legislative interventions of various sorts
may become more consistent and easier to predict.
One of the main insights of this contribution is that the presence of
secondary legislation is, in certain cases at least, prone to influence the case
law of the Court of Justice relating to the interpretation of particular
provisions of the Treaties. However, in other cases, it seems that the passage of
legislation has no, or next to no, impact on the case law of the Court. There are
huge inconsistencies in the Court’s approach, and these have important
constitutional ramifications. Depending on one’s perspective as to the
“proper” relationship between the judiciary and the legislature, one will be
likely to have different views as to the extent to which the passage of
legislation should be able to influence the Court’s reading of the primary law.
The potential subject matter of this article is vast. The article begins with an
explanation of the context in which EU secondary legislation is adopted.
Next, it illustrates the nature of the relationship between primary and
secondary law by using a number of relatively high profile examples with
which most readers will be familiar, each showing the relationship in a rather
different light. It concludes with some more theoretical reflections on the
nature of the relationship between primary and secondary law, and the
respective roles of the judiciary and the legislature in the EU legal order.
2. Secondary law in the EU
The Treaties, most recently amended by theMember States in 2009 at Lisbon,
create the framework within which the EU legislature operates. The Treaty of
Lisbon is the latest in a long line of Treaty amendments. It made substantial
changes to the common provisions of the Treaties. Of particular note is the
newArticle 6 TEU, which affirms the Union’s commitment to human rights.
It states for the first time that the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union “shall have the same
legal value as the Treaties”. It also makes provision for the EU to accede to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms 1950 (ECHR);2 and states, in much the same way as in previous
Treaties, that fundamental rights “shall constitute general principles of the
2. In Opinion 2/13 of 18 Dec. 2014, EU:C:2014:2475, the Court of Justice ruled that
the Draft accession agreement was not compatible with the Treaties; see further Editorial
Comments, “The EU’s accession to the ECHR–A ‘no’from the ECJ!”, 52CML Rev. (2015), 1.
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Union’s law”. It also organizes the functioning of the Union and determines
the areas of, delimitation of, and arrangements for, the exercise of
competence.3 It designates particular competences as “exclusive”, “shared”,
and “supporting”, and introduces, and describes the effect of, the principles of
conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality,4 and outlines a range of different
legislative procedures, and, in broad terms, the permissible objectives of EU
action under each legal base.
The complexity of the EU legislative process is well known. The
Commission, Council, European Parliament, and potentially a number of
other institutional actors, combine in a variety of ways, to produce EU
secondary law.5 It is, in general, impossible to adopt EU level legislation
without the agreement of at least a qualified majority of the Member States.
There are a number of theories which seek to explain the structure of the EU
law-making process, and the resulting institutional balance.6 There are – and
this is emphasized here because of the impact it may be thought to have on the
relationship between the legislature and the judiciary – concerns about the
transparency and accountability of the legislative process, which manifest
themselves more generally as concerns about a “democratic deficit” within
the EU.7
Much of the academic analysis has focused on the different legislative
procedures involved – particularly on whether the Council may adopt
measures via qualifiedmajority, or only via unanimity. Legislative procedures
of course have a big impact on how easily secondary legislation may be
adopted, and on the form of such legislation – it is, for example, likely that
legislation will be more flexible, and afford theMember States a greater range
of options, where its adoption depends on the agreement of each and every
Member State.
But, for the purposes of this piece, it is the objectives of EU level action that
are more important. In particular, secondary lawmay, as we shall see, relate to
primary law in a variety of different ways. Typically, where the legislature
acts, it aims to afford greater clarity and specificity to the text of the Treaties.
Its interventions should be read in the light of pre-existing judicial
3. Art. 1 TFEU. Categories and areas of Union competence are outlined inArts. 2–6 TFEU.
4. Art. 5 TEU.
5. See Arts. 288–299 TFEU.
6. See e.g. Craig, “Institutions, power, and institutional balance”, in Craig and De Búrca
(Eds.), The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd ed. (OUP, 2011).
7. See e.g. Craig, “Democracy and rule-making within the EC:An empirical and normative
assessment”, 3 ELJ (1997), 105; Lord, “Assessing democracy in a contested polity”, 39 JCMS
(2001), 641; and for an illustration of the operation of the process in practice, Acosta, “The
good, the bad and the ugly in EU migration law: Is the European Parliament becoming bad and
ugly? (The adoption of Directive 2008/15: The returns Directive)”, 11 European Journal of
Migration and Law (2009), 19.
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elaborations of the meaning of the text of theTreaties, and in the context of an
ongoing constitutional dialogue between the legislature and the judiciary. The
legislature may be aiming to depart, in some way, from the pre-existing
understanding relating to the meaning and/or scope of particular provisions;
or it may merely be aiming to make the case law of the Court more visible and
accessible.
It is also important to distinguish between interventions which take the
form of total harmonization measures, which pre-empt contrary national
action; and situations in which it is intended that primary and secondary law
will coexist.8 In the first situation, secondary legislation effectively displaces
primary law, with the result being that the legality of national provisions will
be dependent solely on their compliance with secondary law.9 Primary law
does, nevertheless, bind the legislative institutions: it is still possible, as we
shall see in more detail below, for secondary law to be annulled for breaching
primary law, to be interpreted with reference to primary law, and/or to be
rendered inapplicable as a result of a conflict with primary law.10 In the second
situation, the legality of any national action falls to be assessed with reference
to both secondary law and primary law. Such is the case where, for example,
there is a regime of minimum harmonization in place; and national provisions
must comply with both the “floor” set by secondary legislation and the
“ceiling” set by the Treaties.11 The difference between the two situations may
be the result of the limits of EU legislative competence, a simple failure to
reach agreement on a regime of total harmonization, a clear statement by the
legislature that something other than total harmonization is the objective, or
even – and here the relationship between the legislature and the judiciary is
8. See also Mortelmans, “The relationship between the Treaty rules and Community
measures for the establishment and functioning of the internal market –Towards a concordance
rule”, 39 CML Rev. (2002), 1303.
9. See e.g. Case 148/78, Ratti, EU:C:1979:110. See further Schütze, European
Constitutional Law (CUP, 2012), pp. 364–368, who distinguishes between “field”, “obstacle”
and “rule” pre-emption. Of these, only “field” pre-emption is straightforward; the others
depend on the way in which the EU legislation and national rules are interpreted.
10. See also Sorensen, “Reconciling secondary legislation with the Treaty rights of free
movement”, 36 EL Rev. (2011), 344 and 359.
11. See e.g. Case C-203/96, Dusseldorp, EU:C:1998:316. See further Dougan, “Minimum
harmonization and the internal market”, 37 CML Rev. (2000), 853; and Boeger, “Minimum
harmonisation, free movement and proportionality”, in Syrpis (Ed.), The Judiciary, the
Legislature and the EU Internal Market (Cambridge University Press, 2012), Ch. 4. Along
broadly similar lines, Horsley distinguishes between situations in which provisions of
secondary legislation are read as “exhaustive statements on the scope of application of EU law
in particular fields” and other areas in which the Court has “a broader competence to review,
adjust and/or fill gaps in the legal framework established by specific EU directives, regulations
and decisions”; Horsley, “Reflections on the role of the Court of Justice as the ‘motor’ of
European integration: Legal limits to judicial lawmaking”, 50 CML Rev. (2013), 947.
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rendered even more complicated – judicial interpretation of primary and/or
secondary law. It is important to note that neither the distinction between
regulations and directives, nor whether the measure in question was adopted
under an internal market or other legal basis, can be determinative of the
extent to which the national legislature retains autonomy. It is necessary in
each case to interpret eachTreaty provision, and each legislative intervention.
One of the problems is that the language of the Treaties is open-textured; so
that legal bases afford significant room for manoeuvre for the legislative
institutions.12 Also, the key actors in the legislative process will often
disagree, with the result that legislation is itself unclear. The tensions between
uniformity and diversity, and between the economic and the social, which are
a feature of the Treaties, are often all too apparent in the preambles, and also
the text, of secondary legislation.
3. A classification of the case law
This section classifies the case law of the Court. The examples have been
arranged in a particular order. I begin with the cases in which it appears that
primary law is hierarchically superior to secondary law; and move through a
series of cases, ending with what may be thought of as the more
constitutionally unorthodox case law, in which the existence of secondary law
has a significant impact on the interpretation of the text of the Treaties and
other forms of primary law. While it may well be possible to argue with the
way in which particular cases have been classified, the central claim here is
that the Court does not adopt a consistent approach to the relationship between
primary and secondary law, and that the inconsistencies in its approach have
important constitutional ramifications, in particular in relation to the power of
the legislature to affect the Court’s interpretation of the dictates of the text of
the Treaties.
The first set of cases I examine are judicial review cases in which the
legality or validity of secondary legislation is examined with reference to
primary law. Where the Court annuls secondary legislation, or provisions
within secondary legislation, it does so because it holds that such legal
provisions infringe primary law. This is indicative of a constitutional
arrangement in which secondary law is subservient to primary law, and in
which a key task of the judiciary is to keep the legislature within the
parameters established by primary law.And clearly, within the EU legal order,
all secondary law is subject to judicial review. In cases in which secondary
12. See Pollack, “Creeping competence: The expanding agenda of the European
Community”, 14 Journal of Public Policy (1994), 95.
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law is held to be unlawful or invalid, the Court decides that secondary
legislation cannot be interpreted so as to comply with the dictates of primary
law, and therefore takes the step of annulling the contribution of the
legislature.
The bulk of the article deals not with cases which result in the illegality or
invalidity of secondary law on the grounds that it is incompatible with primary
law, but rather with cases in which it is held that it is possible to interpret
secondary law in accordance with the dictates of primary law.There are, as we
shall see, a variety of approaches which the Court has adopted in relation to
the interpretation of legislation; either interpreting it literally, or interpreting it
more teleologically, either in the light of the stated objectives of the legislation
as perhaps expressed in the preamble, or in the light of the Treaties.13 There
are also, as we shall see, a number of approaches which the Court has adopted
in relation to the interpretation of primary law. In classifying the interpretation
cases, I begin with those cases in which secondary law is interpreted in the
light of primary law. In these cases, it appears difficult, if not impossible, for
the intervention of the legislature to have any meaningful impact on the case
law of the Court relating to the interpretation of the Treaties. Rather like the
cases in which secondary law is held to be unlawful, the outcome is that
primary law (as interpreted by the judiciary) takes priority over secondary law.
However, there are significant differences between the two strands of case law.
In the cases in which secondary law is annulled or held to be invalid, there is
held to be a direct conflict between primary and secondary law which is
settled in favour of the provision of primary law; while in the interpretation
cases the putative collision between primary and secondary law is interpreted
away. Nevertheless, it is secondary lawwhich is interpreted so as to make it fit
within the dictates of primary law; and hence it is primary law which de facto
takes priority over secondary law.
Next, I consider cases in which both primary law and secondary law are
interpreted neutrally. Just like in the previous category of cases, the legality of
secondary law is not at issue, but this time, the interpretation of primary and
secondary law is neutral. In such cases, one sees the impact which the Treaties
may have on the interpretation of secondary legislation, but one also sees the
impact which secondary legislation may have on the interpretation of the
Treaties.
Finally there are a number of cases in which it is clear that secondary
legislation has had a significant impact on the Court’s interpretation of
13. See more broadly Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of
Justice (2012, Cambridge University Press); Beck, The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice
of the EU (Hart, 2012); Micklitz and De Witte (Eds.), The European Court of Justice and the
Autonomy of the Member States (Intersentia, 2012).
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primary law – in such cases, the conventional understanding of the normative
constitutional hierarchy is reversed, with the result that provisions in the
Treaties either are interpreted, or appear to be interpreted, in the light of
secondary legislation.14
There is no neat way to distinguish between cases which involve a literal,
natural, or neutral interpretation of the words and aims of the Treaties and
secondary legislation; and those which involve what may be described as a
strained interpretation in which liberties are taken with the ordinary meaning
of words, or ordinary understandings of the aims of particular provisions.
Thus, there maywell be disagreement about the way in which I have classified
particular cases. However, there should be no scope to argue against the
fundamental point; for better or worse, some pieces of secondary legislation
appear to have little or no impact on the interpretation of primary law, whereas
others appear to be capable of exerting a profound effect on the Court’s
reading of primary law. The nature of the relationship between primary and
secondary law, and between the judiciary and the legislature, is very different
in the two situations.
3.1. In which primary law “trumps” secondary law
Cases relating to the legality or validity of the acts of the EU institutions can
come before the Court of Justice in one of two ways; either directly, under
Article 263 TFEU, or indirectly, via Article 267 TFEU references from a
national court, in cases in which issues relating to the validity of an act of the
EU institutions are raised. The grounds of review are stated in Article 263
TFEU – “lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural
requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their
application, or misuse of powers”.
There are not many cases in which the Court chooses to annul EU
legislation – but the existence of a strong-form judicial review power,15 vested
14. The line of cases beginning with Case C-144/04, Mangold, EU:C:2005:709, and
encompassing cases such as Case C-555/07, Kükükdeveci, EU:C:2010:21 and Case C-176/12,
AMS, EU:C:2014:2, is not considered further here. In these cases, reference is made to primary
law (specifically, to general principles of EU law), rather than to EU legislation (specifically,
directives), in order to be able to impose EU law standards on private parties. This technique
provides a way of circumventing the lack of horizontal direct effect of directives. It involves a
degree of creative interpretation (in particular of general principles of law); and reaches its limit
where general principles of law (as for example expressed in the Charter) cannot be interpreted
so as to contain the same subjective rights as are provided in secondary law.
15. See, for a flavour of the US literature, Tushnet, “New Forms of judicial review and the
persistence of rights-and democracy-based worries”, 38Wake Forest Law Review (2003), 813,
and Waldron, “The core of the case against judicial review”, 115 Yale Law Journal
(2005–2006), 1346.
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in the European Court of Justice, to annul secondary law on the grounds that
it infringes primary law (i.e. the Treaties or any rule of law relating to their
application), indicates the existence of a hierarchical relationship between
primary and secondary law. It is also indicative of the fact that, at least in
certain cases, the judiciary has the power to unmake legislative choices, on the
ground that primary law has been infringed. However, it seems that the Court
has “neither announced nor applied the standard of review consistently even
when dealing with similar questions”.16
As we will see in the subsections which follow, the Court often chooses not
to annul EU legislation, but instead finds a way of interpreting either
secondary legislation or the Treaties in such a way as to avoid the conclusion
that there is a direct collision between the two. And yet, there are a number of
cases, both direct actions under Article 263 TFEU and references under
Article 267 TFEU (involving an issue of validity), in which the Court does
annul secondary law on the basis that it infringes the Treaties or any rule of
law relating to their application.17 One such case is Digital Rights Ireland, in
which the Court held that the Data Retention Directive (2006/24)18 was
invalid on the ground that the EU legislature “exceeded the limits imposed by
compliance with the principle of proportionality in the light of Articles 7, 8
and 52(1) of the Charter (of Fundamental Rights)”.19 In the case, the Court, in
line with the Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, held that the Data
Retention Directive interfered with the rights protected byArticles 7 and 8 of
the Charter (on the right to respect for private and family life; and on the right
to protection of personal data); that it was in principle possible for such
interference to be justified in the fight against serious crime; but that the EU
measure was not proportionate. The Court held that the infringement with the
Charter right was serious, and that the EU measure went further than
necessary in order to be justifiable. The Court held that the EU measure was
too general, that it did not provide for exceptions, and that it did not provide
sufficient safeguards for individuals. As a result of the fact that secondary
legislation did not comply with the primary law (in this case the Charter), it
was annulled.
16. Fritzsche, “Discretion, scope of judicial review and institutional balance in European
law”, 47 CML Rev. (2010), 380. Cf. e.g. Case 42/84, Remia v. Commission, EU:C:1985:327
and compare with Case C-225/91,Matra SA v. Commission, EU:C:1993:239.
17. Another famous example is Case C-236/09, Test-Achats, EU:C:2011:100, in which the
Court held that Art. 5(2) of Directive 2004/113 implementing the principle of equal treatment
between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services (O.J. 2004, L
373/37) was invalid from 21 Dec. 2012 (i.e. on the expiry of an “appropriate” transitional
period) on the grounds that it infringed Arts. 21 and 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
18. O.J. 2006, L 105/54.
19. Joined Cases C-293 & 594/12, Digital Rights Ireland, EU:C:2014:238, para 69.
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The result of a successful judicial review action is that EU secondary
legislation is annulled by the Court. The legislature has to decide how to
respond to the judgment of the Court. It may choose not to legislate again in
the area in question.Alternatively it may attempt to legislate again, taking care
this time not to infringe primary law (as interpreted by the Court). One
well-known illustration is the Tobacco Advertising saga. First, the legislature
adopted Directive 98/43,20 one of a series of measures regulating tobacco
production and advertising, which essentially sought to ban all forms of
advertising of tobacco products away from the point of sale. Germany
challenged the competence of the EU institutions to adopt the Directive on the
basis of what is now Article 114 TFEU; and succeeded in its judicial review
action against the European Parliament and Council.21 This was on the basis
that the Directive did not contribute to the establishment and functioning of
the internal market as it failed to eliminate either barriers to free movement
(the Court held that the emergence of such barriers had to be “likely” and that
the measure in question had to be designed to prevent them) or distortions of
competition (the Court held that these had to be “appreciable”).22 The
response of the legislature was to adopt Directive 2003/33,23 which again
sought to ban tobacco advertising but with a more tailored measure. The
Preamble of the Directive was recast, and the danger that barriers to free
movement and appreciable distortions of competition would emerge was
highlighted. In addition, the new Directive included a clause which insisted
that Member States should not prohibit or restrict the free movement of
products complyingwith theDirective. Germany again challenged the legality
of the Directive.24 In their argumentation before the Court, the Parliament and
Council responded to the TobaccoAdvertising I judgment, and drew attention
to the risks of barriers and distortions arising as a result of the accession of new
Member States. This time, they persuaded the Court that the Directive was
properly based on what is now Article 114 TFEU, and that it was therefore
lawful. A sufficiently determined, united and well-advised legislature can, it
seems, respond to judicial sanction;25 though only if it is prepared to reorient
20. O.J. 1998, L 213/9.
21. Case C-376/98, Germany v. European Parliament and Council, EU:C:2000:544
(Tobacco Advertising I).
22. See Syrpis, “Smoke without fire: The social policy agenda and the internal market”, 30
Industrial Law Journal (2001), 273–277.
23. O.J. 2003, L 152/16.
24. Case C-380/03, Germany v. European Parliament and Council, EU:C:2006:772
(Tobacco Advertising II).
25. For the classic account of the difficulties facing the legislature, see Scharpf, “The
joint-decision trap: Lessons from German federalism and European integration”, 66 Public
Admininstration (1988), 239.
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its actions so as to fit with the Court’s interpretation of the dictates of the
Treaties.26
3.2. In which primary law “takes priority over” secondary law
As hinted above, the Court often manages to find ways of avoiding the need to
declare acts of the EU institutions unlawful, or invalid. This may be done by
straining the interpretation of either secondary law – or, indeed, as we shall
see below, primary law – so that any putative collision between the two is
avoided. The more constitutionally orthodox position is to strain the
interpretation of secondary law, so that it is brought into conformity with
primary law. One such example, and there are many, is the case of Sturgeon,
discussed below.27 But there are also other techniques, discussed at the end of
this subsection, which the Court is able to use to prioritize primary over
secondary law – either as a result of a Court decision that secondary law is
inapplicable in particular circumstances, or as a result of the application of the
proportionality principle to national action apparently in conformity with the
dictates of secondary law.28
In Sturgeon, the Court had the task of interpreting Regulation 261/2004,29
a total harmonization measure establishing common rules on compensation
and assistance to passengers, in the event of a) flight cancellations and b)
delays. Articles 5 and 6 of the Regulation appeared to distinguish between
situations in which the flight was cancelled, and those in which the flight was
delayed, seeming to grant the Article 7 right to compensation only in the case
of cancellation. The Court interpreted the legislation so that compensation
would be granted to those whose flights were delayed as well as to those
whose flights were cancelled. The first point to note, which links with the
observation above that judicial review is unusual, is that the Court stated that,
according to a general principle of interpretation, Union acts must be
interpreted in such a way as not to affect their validity.30 Thus, Union acts
“must be interpreted in accordance with primary law as a whole, including the
26. The tobacco saga continues. The challenges to the latest Tobacco Directive (the
Tobacco Products Directive 2014/40, O.J. 2014, L 127/1) are now pending before the ECJ; see
Case C-358/14, Poland v. Parliament and Council, and Case C-547/14, Philip Morris Brands
and others.
27. Joined Cases C-402 & 432/07, Sturgeon, EU:C:2009:716. See also, in the citizenship
context, Case C-456/02, Trojani, EU:C:2004:488, and Joined Cases C-22 & 23/08, Vatsouras,
EU:C:2009:344.
28. Davies distinguishes between “emasculatory interpretation” and “avoidance”, and
illustrates these techniques with a range of examples; see Davies, op. cit. supra note 1.
29. O.J. 2004, L 46/1.
30. Joined Cases C-402 & 432/07, Sturgeon, para 47. See also Sorensen, op. cit. supra note
10, 346.
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principle of equal treatment, which requires that comparable situations must
not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the
same way unless such treatment is objectively justified”.31 The Court then
went to great lengths to compare the situation of passengers whose flights are
delayed, and those whose flights are cancelled, concluding that they suffer
similar damage, and that there are no objective grounds capable of justifying
a difference in treatment.32 Thus, the Regulation “must be interpreted as
meaning that passengers whose flights are delayed may be treated, for the
purposes of the application of the right to compensation, as passengers whose
flights are cancelled and they may thus rely on the right to compensation laid
down in Article 7”.33 There was some, to my mind unconvincing, reliance on
the preamble to the Regulation, and indeed the “objective” of the Regulation,
to support the reasoning of the Court,34 but it is difficult to escape the
conclusion that the Court interpreted the Regulation in the way that it did
because it felt confident enough to hold that the distinction between
cancellation and (long) delay, which appears in the text of the Regulation, was
not compatible with the principle of equal treatment, which, as a general
principle of EU law has the status of primary law.
Advocate General Sharpston’s Opinion in the case was more guarded. She
drew attention to the fact that “save for a brief mention by the Polish
Government, the Court has heard no argument as to the potential impact, on
the questions referred, of the principle of equal treatment. The possibility that
an examination of the distinction between delay and cancellationmight lead to
the conclusion that the way in which the Regulation treats these two concepts
violates that fundamental principle of [EU] law has therefore not been dealt
with in any adequate way”. She thus proposed that the oral proceedings be
reopened, and that institutions and theMember States be given the opportunity
“to put forward arguments relating to objective justification”.35 Unlike the
Court, the Advocate General did not think that “the underlying problem can
be ‘fixed’by interpretation, however constructive”, and so suggested “that the
Court should reopen the oral procedure pursuant to Article 61 of the Rules of
Procedure of the Court of Justice and invite submissions from the Member
States, the Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council on
whether Articles 5 and 7 of the Regulation and Article 6 of the Regulation,
31. Ibid., para 48.
32. Ibid., paras. 49–59.
33. Ibid., paras. 69.
34. Ibid., paras. 43 and 44. The A.G., on the other hand, draws attention to the
Commission’s stated view that “in present circumstances operators should not be obliged to
compensate delayed passengers”; ibid., Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in Joined Cases C-402 &
432/07, Sturgeon, EU:C:2009:416, para 31.
35. Ibid., Opinion of A.G. Sharpston, para 65.
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and specifically the distinction they introduce between cancellation and delay,
are invalid in the light of the principle of equal treatment”.36Thus, the Opinion
and the judgment illustrate different views relating to the extent to which the
judiciary should be prepared to interpret secondary law creatively, or perhaps
to rewrite secondary law, so that it can be found to be compatible with primary
law and so that its validity need not be brought into question.
Commission v. Germany illustrates another way in which the Court
approaches the relationship between primary and secondary law, and another
technique available to it for prioritizing the dictates of primary law.37The case
concerned a potential German breach of the EU public procurement rules.The
specific problem was that local authorities had awarded service contracts of
above a certain threshold size, in respect of occupational old-age pensions,
directly to bodies referred to in a collective agreement, without the call for
tenders at the EU level demanded by Directives 92/50 and 2004/18.38 The
Court devoted a large section of its judgment to what it termed the
“applicability” of the relevant directives. The Court would have held
the Directives inapplicable in the circumstances of the case, had it found that
compliance with the Directives was incompatible with the fundamental right
to bargain collectively, protected in a range of international instruments,
including the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights “an instrument to which
Article 6 TEU accords the same legal value as the Treaties”.39 It was only as a
result of the fact that the Court concluded that it was possible to reconcile the
“attainment of the social objective pursued by the signatories of the
[agreement] in the exercise of their right to bargain collectively” with
compliance with the Directives,40 that EU secondary legislation was applied
to the facts of the case, and that Germany was ultimately found to be in breach
of EU law.
The final example given in this section is the case of Baumbast.41 In
Baumbast, arguments centred on whether EU citizens were able to enjoy
rights of residence in a host Member State by virtue of what is nowArticle 21
TFEU.42That provision famously grants citizens “the right to move and reside
36. Ibid., para 97.
37. Case C-271/08, Commission v. Germany, EU:C:2010:426. See further Syrpis and
Novitz, “The EU internal market and domestic labour law – Looking beyond autonomy”, in
Bogg, Costello, Davies and Prassl (Eds.), The Autonomy of Labour Law (Hart, 2015,
forthcoming).
38. Directive 92/50/EEC, O.J. 1992, L 209/1. Directive 2004/18/EC, O.J. 2004, L 134/114.
39. Case C-271/08, Commission v. Germany, para 37.
40. Ibid., para 66.
41. See Case C-413/99, Baumbast, EU:C:2002:493.
42. For amuch fuller account of the interplay between the judiciary and the legislature in the
citizenship context, see the chapters by Wollenschläger and Nic Shuibhne in Syrpis, op. cit.
supra note 11.
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freely within the territory of the Member State”, but states that the right is to
be “subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by
the measures adopted to give them effect”. Thus, somewhat unusually,43 a
primary law right appears to be subject to the limitations and conditions in
secondary law; a normative inversion sure to complicate the nature of the
relationship between primary and secondary law. The relevant limitation in
Baumbast was in Article 1 of Directive 90/364 (now incorporated within
Directive 2004/38),44 which provided that “Member States can require of the
nationals of a Member State who wish to enjoy the right to reside within their
territory that they themselves and the members of their families be covered by
sickness insurance in respect of all risks in the host Member State and have
sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the social assistance
system of the host Member State during their period of residence”.45 It was
accepted that Mr Baumbast had sufficient resources, and that he had
comprehensive sickness insurance in his home State, Germany. However, he
did not have sickness insurance in the host State, the UK. The Court held
that the limitations and conditions in secondary legislation “must be applied
in compliance with the limits imposed by [Union] law and in accordance
with the general principles of that law, in particular the principle of
proportionality”,46 and concluded that “to refuse to allow Mr Baumbast to
exercise the right of residencewhich is conferred on him by [Art. 21(1)TFEU]
by virtue of the application of the provisions ofDirective 90/364 on the ground
that his sickness insurance does not cover the emergency treatment given in
the host Member State would amount to a disproportionate interference with
the exercise of that right”.47 The result is “an appreciable decrease” in the
“effective regulatory competence” of the EU legislature;48 as a result of the
intervention of the Court.
3.3. In which primary and secondary law are interpreted neutrally
This subsection is devoted to two recent cases in which total harmonization
was involved. The relevant pieces of legislation were Directives 70/311/EEC
43. Note however that many of the rights in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights are
expressed granted only “in accordance with EU law and national laws and practices”.
44. Directive 90/364, O.J. 1990, L 180/26. Directive 2004/38/EC, O.J. 2004, L 158/77.
45. Case C-413/99, Baumbast, para 87.
46. Ibid., para 91.
47. Ibid., para 93.
48. Dougan, “The constitutional dimension to the case law on Union citizenship”, 31 EL
Rev. (2006), 640. The continuing inconsistencies in the Court’s approach in the citizenship
arena, in particular as regards the interpretation of Art. 24 of Directive 2004/38, are again
obvious in the recent decisions of the Court in Case C-140/12, Brey, EU:C:2013:565, and Case
C-333/13, Dano, EU:C:2014:2358.
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and 2007/46/EC relating to the steering equipment of passenger vehicles.49
These directives were considered by the Court of Justice inMarch 2014, in the
context of enforcement actions against Poland and Lithuania.50 These
Member States obliged vehicle manufacturers to reposition the steering
equipment of passenger vehicles to the left hand side, for reasons connected to
ensuring road safety and protecting the health and lives of people.51 This
created problems for those seeking to register vehicles originating in the UK
and Ireland. The Commission argued that the repositioning requirement was
contrary to EU law. It should be noted at the outset that the legal framework
appeared to be different in relation to new passenger vehicles, in respect of
which the Directives apply; and in relation to vehicles previously registered in
anotherMember State, in respect of which the Directives do not apply, leaving
the legal assessment to be conducted with reference to primary law.52
I start with the way in which the Court dealt with the application of primary
law – here Article 34 TFEU – to vehicles previously registered in another
Member State. The Court was clear that the contested legislation constituted a
measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction, in so far as its
effect was to hinder access to the Polish market for vehicles lawfully
constructed and registered in other Member States.53 The question was then
whether the national legislation was justified, and whether it was
proportionate.The Court had little difficulty in accepting that, in principle, the
legislation at issue was appropriate for reducing the risk of accidents on Polish
roads.54Attention then turned to proportionality. For a number of reasons, the
Court felt able to conclude that the legislation was not proportionate, and that
Poland had therefore failed to fulfil its obligations under EU law.
First, the Polish legislation tolerated the risk involved in tourists driving in
Poland in vehicles equipped with a steering wheel on the right. According to
the Court, the risk is “the same, particularly as the flow of visitors in Polish
territory is continuous, and the risk cannot be considered to be less important
on the ground that the visitors visiting Poland for a limited period with such a
vehicle drive more carefully than those whose vehicle is registered in that
49. Directive 70/311/EEC, O.J. 1970, L 133/10. Directive 2007/46/EC, O.J. 2007, L 263/1.
50. See Case C-639/11, Commission v. Poland, EU:C:2014:173. Case 61/12, Commission
v. Lithuania, EU:C:2014:172, is materially identical.
51. Ibid., para 25.
52. Ibid., para 28. This was also emphasized byA.G. Jääskinen who stated, at para 67 of his
Opinion, that “it is clear from the first paragraph of Article 1 of Framework Directive 2007/46
that that directive harmonizes only ‘the administrative provisions and general technical
requirements for approval of all new vehicles within its scope’”.
53. Ibid., para 52.
54. Ibid., paras. 54–57.
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Member State”.55 Second, the Court referred to the fact that “the legislation of
22 Member States, that is to say a large majority of the Member States, either
allows explicitly the registration of vehicles which have their steering
equipment on the same side as the direction of the traffic, or tolerates such”.56
Third, the Court noted that “the statistical data relied on by the Polish
Government do not prove to the requisite legal standard the relationship
between the number of accidents put forward and the involvement of vehicles
with the driver’s seat on the right”.57 Fourth, the Court pointed out that “there
exist means and measures less restrictive of free movement of goods than the
measure at issue”, and capable of significantly reducing the risk of accidents;
for example imposing other measures that would be capable of ensuring
sufficient rear and forward visibility for the drivers of cars with the
steering-wheel positioned on the same side as the direction of traffic.58
In relation to the argument here, a fifth reason given by the Court is
particularly interesting.59 The Court stated that “the risk arising from the use
in the Polish territory of vehicles with the steering wheel on the right is the
same, whether those vehicles are new or previously registered in another
Member State” (emphasis added). As stated above, new vehicles are covered
by the secondary law, and by this stage in its judgment, the Court had already
concluded “that the legislature took account of the potential risks when it
adopted Article 2a of Directive 70/311”.60 We know that, taken together, the
above reasons were enough to render the Polish rule disproportionate.
However, we do not know whether one, or some, taken in isolation, would
have the same effect. In particular, we do not know whether, given the Court’s
assertion that new and previously registered vehicles represent the same risk,
the legislature’s assessment of the risk in relation to new vehicles also
automatically applies to previously registered vehicles; or whether it applies
to previously registered vehicles only as a result of the coincidence of the
various factors referred to in paragraphs 59 to 64 of the judgment. If the
former is correct, the legislation on new vehicles effectively also applies to
previously registered vehicles; a substantial increase in the scope of the
legislation in question. If the latter is correct, then, notwithstanding the
55. Ibid., para 60.
56. Ibid., para 61.The A.G.makes the point, at para 93 of his Opinion, that the rules in force
in Poland and Lithuania are “relatively isolated”.
57. Ibid., para 62.
58. Ibid., para 63.
59. It is perhaps worth noting that this was in fact the first reason given by the Court;
though it is impossible to knowwhether to attach any significance to the order in which reasons
were listed by the Court.
60. See Case C-639/11, Commission v. Poland, para 59. Interestingly, the A.G. did not
make this connection in the parts of his Opinion which dealt with new cars and with those
already registered in another Member State.
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Court’s analysis of the risk assessment, it must be the case that, as suggested
by the scope of the secondary legislation, a different legal framework applies
to new and previously registered vehicles. It is amatter of some frustration that
the reasoning of the Court does not make this point clear.
I now turn to the first section of the judgment, in which the Court discussed
the applicability of the two directives to new passenger vehicles. Directive
70/311/EEC was based on Article 100 EEC (now Art. 115 TFEU); and
Directive 2007/46/EC was based on Article 95 EC (now Art. 114 TFEU).
Thus, they are both internal market measures. They are both directives (and
Directive 2007/46 is a “framework directive”). The Court pointed out that the
Directives establish a “harmonized framework”, creating “a uniform-type
approval procedure for new vehicles, based on the principle of total
harmonization”.61 The aim was “the establishment and functioning of the
internal market, while seeking to ensure a high level of road safety”.62 The
main point of disagreement between the Commission and the Polish
Government related to whether the determination of the position of the
driver’s seat of a vehicle was within the scope of the Directives. The Court
held that it was. “The European Union legislature granted in that regard a
freedom tomotor vehicle manufacturers that may not be cancelled or impeded
by national legislation”.63 It reasoned that the legislature “took account of that
potential risk” resulting from having steering equipment on the same side as
the direction of the traffic when it addedArticle 2a to Directive 70/311 at the
time of the accession of the UK to the EU without supplementing the list of
requirements in the Annex to the Directive,64 and that it was therefore clear
that “the position of the driver’s seat, an integral part of the steering equipment
of a vehicle, comes within the harmonization established by [the]
Directives”.65 Thus, once the Court had established that the position of the
steering-wheel of new vehicles fell within scope of the Directives in question,
and once it had characterized them as being based on the principle of total
harmonization, it was able, with sole reference to the Directives in question,
and without recourse to provisions of primary law, to conclude that national
rules obliging vehicle manufacturers to reposition the steering equipment
were contrary to EU law.
In these cases, the analysis of the legality of the Polish and Lithuanian rules
as they apply to new passenger vehicles (a situation within the scope of
directives based on the principle of total harmonization) was uncontroversial.
61. Ibid., para 34.
62. Ibid., para 35.
63. Ibid., para 38.
64. Ibid., para 42.
65. Ibid., para 47.
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The main interest lies in the fact that it seems possible to argue that the
approach adopted by the legislature had an impact, perhaps even a decisive
impact, on the Court’s approach to proportionality in a cognate area (i.e. the
legal regime for previously registered vehicles) governed by primary rather
than secondary law.
3.4. In which secondary law “takes priority over” primary law
The final subsection considers a number of cases in which secondary law
takes priority over primary law. I begin with judicial interpretation of the
Posted Workers Directive (PWD), and the changing judicial conception of the
relationship between that Directive and the text of the Treaties. I then go on to
consider other, rather more blatant, examples of the Court allowing secondary
law to take priority over primary law; or at least to have a significant effect on
its own pre-existing case law interpreting provisions of primary law. My aim
is to complete the task of setting out the full spectrum of approaches which the
Court adopts towards legislative interventions.
The Posted Workers Directive (PWD) is a measure with which the Court of
Justice has had occasion to wrestle on many occasions. A root cause of the
difficulties is that the objective of the Directive is far from clear – it was
enacted under an internal market legal basis; but, appears, at least on its face,
to make a much greater contribution to the protection of workers than to the
free provision of services.66 Article 3(1) of that Directive lays down “a
nucleus of mandatory rules for minimum protection” to be observed in the
host country by employers who post workers there. Article 3(7) provides that
paragraphs 1 to 6 “are not to prevent application of terms and conditions of
employment which are more favourable to workers”. Controversially, in
Laval,Article 3(7) was interpreted in such a way that the result was that, under
the Directive, “the level of protection which must be guaranteed to workers
posted to the territory of the host Member State is limited, in principle, to that
provided for in Article 3(1)”.67 A lot has already been written about that;68 to
66. For an account of the history of the Directive, and its relationship with the case law of
the Court, in particular Case C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa, EU:C:1990:142, see Davies, “Posted
workers: Single Market or protection of national labour law systems?”, 34 CML Rev. (1997),
571.
67. Case C-341/05, Laval, EU:C:2007:809, para 81. The one exception is where workers
already enjoy more favourable terms and conditions of employment pursuant to the law or
collective agreements applicable in the “home” Member State.
68. See e.g. Kilpatrick, “Laval’s regulatory conundrum: Collective standard-setting and the
Court’s new approach to posted workers”, 34 EL Rev. (2009), 844; Davies, “One step forward,
two steps back?TheViking and Laval cases in the ECJ”, 37 Industrial Law Journal (2008), 126;
Syrpis and Novitz, “Economic and social rights in conflict: Political and judicial approaches to
their reconciliation”, 33 EL Rev. (2008), 411.
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be fair to the Court, it did at least opt for an interpretation which accords with
the internal market legal basis under which the Directive was enacted.
But, it is not only the interpretation of the Directive, but also the nature of
the relationship between the Directive and the Treaties which is controversial.
In Laval, the Court took pains to point out that “since the purpose of Directive
96/71 is not to harmonize systems for establishing terms and conditions of
employment in the Member States, the latter are free to choose a system at the
national level which is not expressly mentioned among those provided for in
that Directive, provided that it does not hinder the provision of services
between theMember States”.69 Later in the judgment, “the collective action at
issue” in the case was assessed “from the point of view of [Art. 56 TFEU]”.
The clear implication is that a national system going beyond the terms of the
PWD might nevertheless be compatible with the Treaties, and therefore be
lawful, provided that it does not infringe, or lead to infringements of, Article
56 TFEU.70 This conceptualization of the relationship between the PWD and
Article 56 TFEU is not apparent in all cases. In Rüffert, the issue was whether
Article 56 TFEU precluded an authority of a Member State from requiring a
contracting authority to designate as contractors only those which agree in
writing to pay employees at least the wage provided for in the collective
agreement in force at the place where those services are performed.The Court
began by stating that “in order to give a useful answer to the national court, it
is necessary to take into consideration the provisions of Directive 96/71”.71 It
then proceeded to analyse the Directive, and was able, following the approach
it had adopted in Laval, to conclude, at paragraph 35, that the national rules at
issue were not compatible with (its interpretation of) the Directive. The
following paragraph is intriguing. The Court stated that “that interpretation of
Directive 96/71 is confirmed by reading it in the light of [Art. 56TFEU], since
that Directive seeks in particular to bring about the freedom to provide
services, which is one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the
Treaty”.72 The burden of the paragraphs which follow seems to be to show
that the measure in question “is capable of constituting a restriction” and that
69. Case C-341/05, Laval, para 68. See also Case C-522/12, Isbir, EU:C:2013:711, para 35.
70. But note that, even in Laval, the PWD is given centre stage in the assessment of the
proportionality of the restrictions imposed by the trade unions. Azoulai’s comment on the
reasoning in Laval (in particular at para 108) is as follows: “In its judgment, the Court indicates
that the provisions of the Directivemust be interpreted in the light of [Art. 56TFEU]. But, at the
end of the day, it does exactly the opposite: it sticks to a strict interpretation of the Directive and
brings the interpretation of [Art. 56 TFEU] back to this interpretation of the Directive”;
Azoulai, “The Court of Justice and the Social market economy: The emergence of an ideal and
the conditions for its realisation”, 45 CML Rev. (2008), 1353.
71. Case C-346/06, Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen, EU:C:2008:189, para 18.
72. Ibid., para 36. This approach – considering the Directive “interpreted in the light of the
Article 49 EC” – is repeated at para 43, and in the Court’s conclusion.
CML Rev. 201518 Syrpis
“it cannot be considered to be justified”, but it is significant that this is stated
to amount to an interpretation of the Directive in the light ofArticle 56TFEU,
rather than an independent analysis of the Treaty provisions. The strong
suggestion in Rüffert is that the limits of national autonomy are set by the
Court’s controversial interpretation of the PWD (read in the light of the
Treaties); rather than by the Treaties themselves.73 Thus, the Court’s
interpretation of secondary law is capable of having a decisive impact on the
extent to which there is freedom to act under the Treaties.
The Commission’s proposed “Monti II” Regulation can be seen as the
legislature’s attempt to respond to Viking and Laval.74 The proposed
Regulation sought to do little more than to reiterate the constitutional
equivalence between the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide
services on the one hand, and the fundamental right to take collective action on
the other;75 but it faced strong opposition (from both left and right), and failed
to be adopted by the European Parliament and the Council.76 The demise of
the proposed Regulation illustrates the difficulty of achieving a broad enough
political consensus within the European institutions for the adoption of
legislation to temper, or correct, judicial decisions. But, even if the Regulation
had been adopted, there is reason to be sceptical about its potential effect.
Fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms often clash. The idea that the
exercise of one has to respect the other is not a new one; it is recognized in the
case law of the Court,77 and even referred to in Viking and Laval themselves.78
The key questions are about the way in which the Court chooses to navigate
the tension between rights and freedoms in specific factual circumstances;
and it is not clear that the “Monti II” Regulation would necessarily have had
any impact on the case law of the Court. It is also important, and this is
73. See also Barnard, “More posting”, 43 Industrial Law Journal (2014), 194.
74. COM(2012)130. The proposed regulation was accompanied a Commission proposal
for better enforcement of the Posted Workers Directive; COM(2012)131. Directive 2014/67 on
the enforcement of Directive 96/71 was adopted in May 2014; O.J. 2014, L 159/11.
75. The key provision, Art. 2, reads as follows: “The exercise of the freedom of
establishment and the freedom to provide services enshrined in the Treaty shall respect the
fundamental right to take collective action, including the right or freedom to strike, and
conversely, the exercise of the fundamental right to take collective action, including the right or
freedom to strike, shall respect these economic freedoms”. See, for critical comment, Ewing,
The Draft Monti II Regulation: An Inadequate Response to Viking and Laval (Institute of
Employment Rights, 2012,) available at: <www.ier.org.uk/sites/ier.org.uk/files/The%20
Draft%20Monti%2011%20Regulation%20by%20Keith%20Ewing%20March%202012.pdf>.
76. See for the rejection by 19 national parliaments under the so-called “yellow card”
procedure: <www.europolitics.info/social/commission-withdraws-monti-ii-proposal-art3428
21-25.html>.
77. See e.g. Case C-112/00, Schmidberger v. Austria, EU:C:2003:333; and Case C-271/08,
Commission v. Germany, EU:C:2010:426, in particular in the Opinion of A.G. Trstenjak.
78. Case C-438/05, Viking, para 79; Case C-341/05, Laval, para 105.
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especially relevant for the argument in this article, to recognize that the
Regulation would itself be subject to judicial interpretation. It could very
easily be interpreted, in line with the examples provided in section 2 above, in
the light of the Court’s understanding of the dictates of the Treaties.79
The final examples given here represent two of the clearest instances in
which the passage of legislation appears to have had a decisive impact on the
case law of the Court, and on its interpretation of the text of primary law.
The first is the citizenship case of Förster,80 in which the Court “issued a
clear signal of deference to the legislature” in its judgment.81 In the case, a
German national had resided in the Netherlands for three years as a student,
and claimed a maintenance grant. The Court held that the Dutch residence
requirement of five years “does not go beyond what is necessary to attain the
objective of ensuring that students from other Member States are to a certain
degree integrated into the society of the host Member State”.82 The result was
that the subjective integration test laid out in Bidar,83 was “without any
reasoning or discussion, manipulated into an objective five-year condition –
crucially, mirroring the wording ofArticle 24(2) of Directive 2004/38” (albeit
that the Directive was not itself applicable to the facts of Förster).84The Court
decided Förster, in line with the stance adopted by the legislature, but against
the advice of Advocate General Masák. He suggested that the Directive
“cannot detract from the requirement flowing fromArticle [18TFEU] and the
general principle of proportionality”, and suggested that the refusal of a claim
where a student had been resident (and integrated) for three years “would
seem disproportionate”.85 It is clear that, in the citizenship context, there are
divisions within the Court. While there are some cases, like Förster and
Dano,86 in which secondary legislation appears to have a significant impact
79. Along similar lines, see Davies’ “thought experiment” considering “what might have
happened if pre-Keck a regulation had been adopted to the effect that selling arrangements were
not to be seen as obstacles to movement unless unequal in law or in fact”; see Davies, op. cit.
supra note 1, 1596.
80. Case C-158/07, Förster, EU:C:2008:630.
81. Nic Shuibhne, “The third age of citizenship”, in Syrpis, op. cit. supra note 11, 350.
82. Case C-158/07, Förster, para 58.
83. Case C-209/03, Bidar, EU:C:2005:169. In Bidar, a French national resident in the UK
was denied a student maintenance grant as he did not fulfil the eligibility criteria in UK law. He
won his case on the basis that he was able to demonstrate a “genuine link”, and a “degree of
integration”, with UK society. A.G. Geelhoed speculated in relation to the terms of Directive
2004/38 (which were not applicable to the case at hand), Art. 24(2) of which laid down a
five-year residence condition. He argued, at para 64 that it was necessary to ensure that the
requirement adopted by the Union legislature was “applied in conformity with the fundamental
provisions of the [EU Treaties]”.
84. Nic Shuibhne, op. cit. supra note 81, 351.
85. Case C-158/07, Förster, Opinion of A.G. Masák, EU:C:2008:399, at paras. 131–133.
86. Case C-333/13, Dano, EU:C:2014:2358.
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on the interpretation of primary law, there are also cases in which the Court
finds ways of enabling primary law to take priority over secondary law, either
by side-stepping the restrictions in the citizenship Directive,87 or by finding
that particular situations fall outside the scope of the Directive, thus enabling
the Court to apply its pre-existing case law on Article 21 TFEU.88
The final example is Pringle.89 The case concerned the legality of the
European Stability Mechanism, established by Decision 2011/199 and by the
European Stability Mechanism Treaty concluded on 2 February 2012.
Decision 2011/199 added a third paragraph to Article 136 TFEU, enabling a
stability mechanism to be created. The Decision was adopted under Article
48(6) TEU, the simplified revision procedure, which only applies to Treaty
amendments which do not increase the competences conferred on the Union.
Mr Pringle argued that the Decision did entail an alteration of the Union’s
competences, and further argued that the Decision was inconsistent with
Treaty provisions on EMU, in particular the “no-bail out” principle in
Article 125 TFEU.90 He also claimed that the ESM Treaty would confer
new competences and tasks on the Union institutions which would be
incompatible with the existing EU Treaties. The Court of Justice dismissed
Pringle’s challenge and confirmed the legality of the European Stability
Mechanism. The decision was widely anticipated, and has received strong
academic support.91 However, the Court’s cumulative approach to
interpretation, blending literal, systemic, purposive and consequentialist
interpretative criteria has also been the subject of strong criticism, with
Gunnar Beck, for example, finding that the law “no longer appears to
constrain political choices”.92 His view is that the Court’s approach to legal
interpretation “leaves the judiciary free to construct a normative justification
for a political position jointly favoured by the EU institutions and national
governments, almost irrespective of, and often entirely unconstrained by, what
the Treaties say”.93
It should be noted that the legality of the European Stability Mechanism
was also questioned in an action before the German Federal Constitutional
87. See e.g. Joined Cases C-22 & 23/08, Vatsouras.
88. See e.g. Case C-127/08,Metock, EU:C:2008:449.
89. Case C-370/12, Pringle, EU:C:2012:756.
90. Ibid., paras. 137–139. Beck comments that the Court’s approach here amounts to “an
extreme literal interpretation [of Art. 125 TFEU] that effectively reduces a central Treaty
provision to absurdity”; Beck, “The Court of Justice, legal reasoning, and thePringle case: Law
as continuation of politics by other means”, 39 EL Rev (2014), 244.
91. See e.g. Koutrakos, “Political choices and Europe’s judges”, 38 ELJ (2013), 291; De
Witte and Beukers, “The Court of Justice approves the creation of the European Stability
Mechanism”, 50 CML Rev. (2013), 805.
92. Beck, op. cit. supra note 90, 236.
93. Ibid., 238.
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Court (FCC) some two months before Pringle reached the Court of Justice.
The German Court also approved the legality of the ESM, providing,
in Beck’s words, “a singularly ill-reasoned justification for government
policy”.94 For Joerges and Everson, the “converging attitudes of both courts in
the assessment of the praxis of Europe’s crisis management is disquieting
because it accepts the primacy of discretionary politics in the management of
the crisis and fails to develop any criteria against which the legitimacy of these
practices might be assessed”.95 The 2014 decision of the German FCC on the
legality of the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme, in
which the FCC for the first time referred a question to the Court of Justice,
may herald a change in direction on the part of the FCC (and also, in time, on
the part of the Court of Justice); though it is source of regret for many
commentators that the FCC continues to have the interests of Germany, and
the German Constitution, at the forefront of its mind.96
4. Towards a critical analysis of the “proper” relationship between
primary and secondary law
It is clear that the EU possesses a “legal”, rather than a “political”
constitution,97 in which the Court of Justice is afforded a strong-form judicial
review power to annul the interventions of the legislature with reference to
primary law, and a relatively free rein to interpret secondary legislation in
creative ways. And yet, parts of the case law of the Court are unpredictable.
TheCourt has been trenchantly criticized on the one hand (see the reactions to,
for example, Baumbast) for denying the legislature the capacity to exercise its
legislative competence effectively; and on the other (see the reactions to, for
example Pringle) for failing to constrain political choices. Clearly, these
criticisms of the Court are motivated by very different concerns, and by very
different visions of the “proper” relationship between primary and secondary
law in the EU.
94. Ibid., 249.
95. Joerges and Everson, “Who is the guardian for constitutionalism in Europe after the
financial crisis?”, 63 LEQS Paper (2013), 23.
96. See 15 German Law Journal (2014). Special Issue; and Wilkinson, “Economic
messianism and constitutional power in a ‘German Europe’: All courts are equal, but some
courts are more equal than others”, LSE Law, 26 Society and Economy Working Papers (2014).
97. See e.g. Gee and Webber, “What is a political constitution?”, 30 Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies (2010), 273. The EU Treaties create a legal, rather than a political, constitution;
with the result that it falls to the courts to determine the extent to which the political institutions
are able to play their part in the elaboration of the dictates of the constitution.
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It is not at all obvious how to conceptualize the debate on what may be
termed the “proper role” of the Court.98 If one chooses to focus on the fact that
the Court has been explicitly authorized to interpret the Treaties and to annul
legislation which is contrary to the Treaties,99 one ends up with a frame of
reference which privileges the position of primary law over secondary law,
and the position of the judiciary over that of the legislature. If one adopts this
approach, it is easy to conclude that the Court’s interpretation of the Treaties
should not be influenced by the passage of legislation and the vagaries of
politics. In its interpretation of EU legislation, the Court should use the
Treaties as its touchstone, and be prepared (within the limits of judicial
propriety,100 however defined) to strain the meaning of legislation so that it
most closely corresponds with, and indeed furthers, the Court’s conception of
the dictates of the Treaties. According to these accounts, it is not at all
exceptional, or surprising, to find that primary law may either trump, or take
priority over, secondary law; instead, it is alarming to see cases in which the
Court allows the passage of secondary legislation to influence its reading of
the Treaties.
However, this approach can be criticized.Alternative, and less hierarchical,
accounts emphasize the fact that the influence of the political institutions on
the meaning of the key concepts introduced in the Treaties cannot sensibly be
limited to their role in Treaty revision, frequent though that revision is.
According to these accounts, it is not only the judiciary, but also the legislature
which has a role in defining the meaning of the EU’s constitutional text.101
Thus, in line with more “political” accounts of the constitution, and with
“departmentalism” in the United States, “the constitution should be the
property of all those with a stake in its outcomes, and this philosophical
starting point should express itself legally in a situation which may be
described in terms of institutional pluralism, or non-dominance, with neither
courts nor legislatures able to make their view of the constitution the only one
that counts”.102
98. See further Syrpis, op. cit. supra note 11, p. 1.
99. Art. 19 TEU states that the Court “shall ensure that in the interpretation and application
of the Treaties, the law is observed”.
100. There is, of course, a lively debate here; see e.g. Rasmussen,On Law and Policy in the
European Court of Justice: A Comparative Study in Judicial Policy-Making (Nijhoff, 1986);
and Alter, The European Court’s Political Power: Selected Essays (OUP, 2009).
101. See e.g. Armstrong and Bulmer, The Governance of the Single European Market
(Manchester University Press, 1998).
102. See Davies, op. cit. supra note 1, 1585; referring to Kramer, The People Themselves:
Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (OUP, 2004). See further Post and Siegel,
“Popular constitutionalism, departmentalism, and judicial supremacy”, 92 California Law
Review (2004), 1027, who claim (at 1043) that “Kramer’s fundamental indictment is that as
federal courts have expanded and bureaucratized, and as the articulation of constitutional law
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These accounts appear particularly attractive in the EU context. The EU’s
constitutional text is unusually substantive, detailed and concrete. Within it,
there are unresolved tensions between uniformity and diversity, between the
economic and the social, and between human rights and fundamental
freedoms, whose resolution is seen bymany to belong asmuch in the political,
as in the legal, realm.These alternative accounts accept that there are limits on
the freedom of action of the legislature imposed by the Treaties (and policed
by the Court); but they call on the Court, where possible, to strive to reflect the
(democratic) will expressed by the political institutions. This has implications
for the way in which the judiciary should approach its tasks. For example, the
Court should only exercise its power to review the acts of the Union
institutions in extreme circumstances, where for example, the legislature has
“manifestly”, or “manifestly and gravely”, exceeded the limits of its powers. It
should, as far as possible, try to read secondary legislation literally. It should
also be prepared to adjust its own interpretation of Treaty texts in the light of
the stance adopted by the legislature.
Thosewho subscribe to this approachwould agreewith Paul Craig, who has
argued that “where the [Union] legislature has given considered thought to the
more particular meaning to be accorded to a right laid down in aTreaty article
and expressed this through [Union] legislation, the [Union] courts should treat
this with respect”.103 They would also agree with those writers who call for
deference, or self-restraint, on the part of the courts, so as to “avoid intrusion
on the perceived proper domain of political judgement”.104Where the Court is
filling in gaps left by the legislature, it is accepted that it should try to behave
as a good legislator behaves. Where, however, the legislature has spoken, the
question for the Court is whether to unmake, or respect, the legislature’s
choice; and in that situation the Court should be sensitive to the institutional
balance and the discretionary powers of the legislative institutions.105 Under
these alternative accounts, cases in which primary law straightforwardly, or
automatically, trumps or takes priority over secondary law ring alarm bells.
The judiciary is, however, in general terms at least,106 seen as deserving praise
has become pervasive and routinized, the participation of theAmerican people in the formation
of their Constitution has become correspondingly enervated and attenuated”.
103. Craig, EUAdministrative Law (OUP, 2006), p. 520.
104. Weatherill, “Supply of and demand for internal market regulation: Strategies,
preferences and interpretation”, inNic Shuibhne (Ed.),Regulating the InternalMarket (Edward
Elgar, 2006), p. 38.
105. See Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 68.
106. There is of course scope to criticize individual judgments; even though they may
correspond with one’s overall philosophy relating to the relationship between primary and
secondary law.
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for allowing the passage of secondary legislation to influence its reading of the
Treaties.
To the extent that the alternative accounts described above have some
normative attraction, and in the light of the case law analysed in section 3
above, there are lessons for both the legislature and the judiciary.
A first set of lessons concerns the role of the legislature. The EU legislature
is a complex entity, with less of an obvious claim to democratic legitimacy
than the legislative bodies of many nation States. Its competence is bounded,
and the limits of that competence are policed not only by the Court of Justice,
but also by a range of other actors – most notably national governments
(within and outside the Council of Ministers), national Parliaments (in
particular in relation to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality),
national constitutional courts,107 and other international bodies. It is afforded
the competence to intervene in a variety of different ways under various legal
bases. It may, via its legislative interventions, seek to make the case law of the
Court of Justice more visible, typically by embedding concepts and
approaches used by the Court into secondary legislation; or it may seek to
depart from the case law of the Court. It may adopt measures of the total
harmonization variety, which displace the Treaty rules, and which pre-empt
the exercise of national competence; or it may intervene in a range of other
ways which leave primary and secondary law coexisting with each other,
operating so as to create what will inevitably be a murky legal picture. It is an
unhappy feature of EU legislation that the intentions of the legislature are all
too often unclear. Greater clarity – which may well be unattainable given the
divergence of views among the legislature – would make the task of the Court
much more straightforward.
There are also lessons for the Court. The examples provided in section 3
above seem to illustrate that the Court has yet to develop a clear conception of
its “proper role” where the Treaty framework is supplemented with secondary
legislation of various kinds. The Court rarely, if ever, gives an overt
rationalization for its decision to treat interventions of the legislature with
greater or lesser amounts of respect. Indeed, one can go further, and point out
first that the Court does not appear to distinguish systematically between
Treaty revisions and the “mere” adoption of secondary legislation;108 and
second, that it is capable of drawing a wide variety of inferences from the
107. The Court is acutely aware of how its judgments are received in national courts, which
are, of course, part of the same legal epistemic community from which the judges of the Court
are themselves drawn. See Stone Sweet, “The European Court of Justice”, in Craig and de
Búrca, op. cit. supra note 6, p. 146.
108. See further Syrpis, op. cit. supra note 11, ch. 1, p. 23.
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absence (as well as from the presence) of secondary legislation.109 Some of
the reasons for the inconsistent approach of the judiciary can fairly and
appropriately be attributed to the legislature. Where legislation is unclear,
and/or poorly drafted, and where the relationship between primary and
secondary law is not fully specified, the Court cannot be said to have been
afforded a meaningful steer by the legislature, and can do little other than seek
to make the best of a bad job. However, the inconsistencies in the Court’s
approach are not confined to those areas in which legislation is unclear. The
“methodological pluralism and attendant flexibility of the Court’s cumulative
approach [to interpretation] afford the Court of Justice the freedom to favour
almost any conclusion, assuming it can be justified by some argument or
other”.110
It is difficult to envisage a more sophisticated approach to the relationship
between primary and secondary law without a more intensive, and
transparent, constitutional dialogue between the legislature and the judiciary.
To the extent that it is possible to reach agreement, the legislature can and
should send clearer signals to the Court about the intended effects of particular
legislation, in particular as regards the relationship between secondary and
primary law. If legislative interventions are intended to necessitate a shift in
the case law of the Court, the competence to effect such a shift should be
asserted, and the effect on the pre-existing case law on the interpretation of
primary law should be highlighted as clearly and precisely as possible. In turn,
the Court should make a more concerted effort to send clear signals to the
legislature about the potential effects of legislation of various kinds adopted
under various legal bases; and should strive to maintain clearer standards as
regards not only the intensity of judicial review, but also the way in which its
arsenal of interpretative strategies are deployed and combined.111
109. Compare e.g. Case 71/76, Thieffry, EU:C:1977:65, in which the Court held at para 17
that “a person subject to [Union] law cannot be denied the practical benefit of that freedom
solely by virtue of the fact that, for a particular profession, the Directives provided for by [Art.
53 TFEU] have not yet been adopted”; with Case C-210/06, Cartesio, EU:C:2008:723, in
which theCourt states at para 109 “in the absence of a uniformCommunity law definition of the
companies whichmay enjoy the right of establishment on the basis of a single connecting factor
determining the national law applicable to a company, the question whether [Art. 49 TFEU]
applies to a company which seeks to rely on the fundamental freedom enshrined in that article
– like the question whether a natural person is a national of a Member State, hence entitled to
enjoy that freedom – is a preliminary matter which, as Community law now stands, can only be
resolved by the applicable national law”.
110. Beck, op. cit. supra note 90, 237.
111. One feature of the EU Treaty framework is that the ECJ “operates in an unusually
permissive strategic environment. When it interprets the treaties, for instance, its zone of
discretion is virtually unlimited”; Stone Sweet, op. cit. supra note 107, 127. See also Lord
CML Rev. 201526 Syrpis
The current situation is one in which it is almost impossible to predict with
any certainty what effect the passage of secondary legislation will have on the
pre-existing case law of the Court on the interpretation of primary law.
Attempts to isolate factors which might determine the reaction of the Court to
particular legislative interventions also seem doomed to fail. Different
configurations of the Court and differentAdvocates General seem to view the
landscape in which they operate very differently. The Court does not operate
in a political vacuum, and it is not at all surprising that the attitude of
(particular) Member State governments, (particular) national courts,
(particular) international courts and supervisory bodies, not to mention the
likely reaction of the financial markets, will all, at least on occasion, have an
effect on the direction of its case law. However, it is important that the
parameters within which, and the mechanisms through which, the legislature
is able to affect the case law of the Court are more clearly defined; not only
from the perspective of legal certainty, but also in order for it to be possible to
develop a clearer account of the legal and political legitimacy of the European
project.
Mance, “The interface between national and European law”, 38 EL Rev. (2013), 450:
“free-ranging interpretive activity involves courts in decisions which ought to be taken by the
legislature”.
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